Broader Issues: Kids in the U.S. Justice System Kids in Adult Prisons: Some states allow children as young as eight or nine to be tried as adults, leading to youth incarceration in adult facilities, which is dangerous and harmful. Racial Disparities: Youth of color, especially Native American and Black youth, are disproportionately represented in juvenile detention, highlighting systemic bias. "ICE Kids": Children, including some with DACA ties, have been held in facilities like Cowlitz, raising concerns about family separation and the "adultification" of youth to justify harsh treatment. https://www.cato.org/publications/immigration-research-policy-brief/dreamer-incarceration-rate# https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/04/donald-trump-what-is-daca-dreamers https://www.uscis.gov/DACA https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/fact-sheet/dream-act-overview/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deferred_Action_for_Childhood_Arrivals#Origin Human Impact: Many Dreamers consider the U.S. their only home, having grown up there, making threats of deportation devastating. Systemic Problems: The issues highlight broader concerns about immigration policy, the rights of non-citizens, and the fairness of the juvenile justice system, especially for marginalized youth --- On a cold, rainy night last November, Bastian Rodriguez spent the first hours of his 18th birthday inside an Immigration and Customs Enforcement van. Rodriguez was aging out of the Cowlitz County Youth Services Center, a juvenile jail in Longview, Wash., and was on his way to the Northwest ICE Processing Center, a privately run immigration detention facility for adults in Tacoma. He had already spent more than two years in ICE custody. “These adult people are going to beat my ass,” he told me he worried as the van wound its way toward Tacoma. “I know it’s your birthday, so I’m going to be cool with you,” the guard driving the van told Rodriguez, making a pit stop at McDonalds to buy him a Big Mac. As they continued, Rodriguez sat in the back eating, afraid of what would happen to him in the big prison filled with people much older than him. Until recently, Rodriguez’s long detention under ICE control had been rare for someone his age. https://www.aclu.org/news/immigrants-rights/the-ice-kids Abraxas Academy in Pennsylvania was privately operated and its administrators declined UW’s request, but Cowlitz and NORCOR, the detention center in Oregon, sent Godoy copies of the contracts they’d signed with ICE. “The more I scraped the surface and gathered information, the more I was like, ‘Oh my god, how is this happening?’” she said. All three facilities had agreed to detain minors for ICE alongside their existing population of sentenced juveniles in exchange for federal payments. ----\ 50 Years after the Dream: Why Are We Filling our Jails with Kids of Color? https://www.aclu.org/news/criminal-law-reform/50-years-after-dream-why-are-we-filling-our-jails-kids-color -------- For far too many Black, Latino and Native American kids, the justice system is like quicksand: once you step in, it pulls you in deeper and deeper. Take Luis, who was 14 the first time he was placed on probation. His big offense? Asking another student for $2, and having the student report him for bullying. Once he was under correctional control, it became difficult for Luis to escape the pipeline. A few months later, Luis was hanging out with some friends when one of them chose to steal a few items from a store. Luis was arrested alongside his friend, charged with violating probation, and shipped off to a juvenile facility. The facility was horrible for Luis. He had never fought in the street, but he learned to fight in the facility. They tried to medicate him without his parents' permission. And when he came home, there were no support services in place. Given everything we know about the school-to-prison pipeline, what happened next to Luis shouldn't surprise us. The experience of being incarcerated changed him, and since his release Luis has been rearrested several times and now is incarcerated in an adult prison. --- \ https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/aug/06/physical-sexual-abuse-pregnant-women-children-immigration-centers A new report has found hundreds of reported cases of human rights abuses in US immigration detention centers. The alleged abuses uncovered include deaths in custody, physical and sexual abuse of detainees, mistreatment of pregnant women and children, inadequate medical care, overcrowding and unsanitary living conditions, inadequate food and water, exposure to extreme temperatures, denial of access to attorneys, and child separation. The report, compiled by the office of Senator Jon Ossoff, a Democrat representing Georgia, noted it found 510 credible reports of human rights abuses since 20 January 2025. ----- The report from Ossoff’s office was first reported by NBC News. The DHS assistant secretary Tricia McLaughlin said in an email to NBC News in response to the report: “any claim that there are subprime conditions at Ice detention centers are false.” She claimed all detainees in Ice custody received “proper meals, medical treatment, and have opportunities to communicate with lawyers and their family members”. Meredyth Yoon, an immigration attorney and litigation director at Asian Americans Advancing Justice-Atlanta, told NBC News she met with the woman who miscarried, a 23-year-old Mexican national. “The detainee who miscarried described to Yoon witnessing and experiencing ‘horrific’ and ‘terrible conditions’, the attorney said, including allegations of overcrowding, people forced to sleep on the floor, inadequate access to nutrition and medical care, as well as abusive treatment by the guards, lack of information about their case and limited ability to contact their loved ones and legal support,” NBC News reported. DHS denied the allegations. “Regardless of our views on immigration policy, the American people do not support the abuse of detainees and prisoners … it’s more important than ever to shine a light on what’s happening behind bars and barbed wire, especially and most shockingly to children,” Ossoff said in a statement his office issued about the investigation. --------- https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jul/25/florida-teen-immigration-arrest Immigration agents told a teenage US citizen: ‘You’ve got no rights.’ He secretly recorded his brutal arrest This article is more than 5 months old Video from Kenny Laynez-Ambrosio, 18, puts fresh scrutiny on the harsh tactics used to reach the Trump administration’s ambitious enforcement targets --- Laynez-Ambrosio can also be heard telling officers: “I was born and raised right here.” Still, he was pushed to the ground and says that an officer aimed a stun gun at him. He was subsequently arrested and held in a cell at a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) station for six hours. Audio in the video catches the unidentified officers debriefing and appearing to make light of the stun gun use. “You’re funny, bro,” one officer can be overheard saying to another, followed by laughter. Another officer says, “They’re starting to resist more now,” to which an officer replies: “We’re going to end up shooting some of them.” Later in the footage, the officers move on to general celebration – “Goddamn! Woo! Nice!” – and talk of the potential bonus they’ll be getting: “Just remember, you can smell that [inaudible] $30,000 bonus.” It is unclear what bonus they are referring to. Donald Trump’s recent spending bill includes billions of additional dollars for Ice that could be spent on recruitment and retention tactics such as bonuses. Laynez-Ambrosio said his two friends were eventually transferred to the Krome detention center in Miami. He believes they were released on bail and are awaiting a court hearing, but said it has been difficult to stay in touch with them. ----- NATO DIANA's Estonian Accelerator: a hub for defence innovation in Tallinn and Tartu NATO DIANA https://www.diana.nato.int/connect/nato-dianas-estonian-accelerator-a-hub-for-defence-innovation-in-tallinn-and-tartu.html --------- AI on the Battlefield: Top Experts Gather at TalTech to Debate the Future of Military Decision Making 11.11.2025 Krõõt Nõges|Head of Media Relations| kroot.noges@taltech.ee The future of military decision-making and the role of technology in new-generation conflicts will be the core focus of the international EstMilTech 2026 conference, hosted by Tallinn University of Technology (TalTech) on January 14–15, 2026. https://taltech.ee/en/news/ai-battlefield-top-experts-gather-taltech-debate-future-military-decision-making ---------- https://www.e-resident.gov.ee/blog/posts/defence-tech-estonia/ defence tech in focus: estonia hosts its first defence week in 2025 Maya Middlemiss • Sep 22, 2025 • 10 min read Defence tech is evolving fast, and Estonia is emerging as one of its most dynamic hubs in Europe countermeasures to AI-powered detection systems, the race to secure Europe’s borders is no longer theoretical. It’s happening right now. Against this backdrop, Estonia is hosting its first Defence Week from 22-26 September 2025. This event will bring together founders, policymakers, and security experts to exchange ideas and showcase solutions. For entrepreneurs, the event highlights Estonia’s growing role as a hub for defence tech startups and dual-use innovation. Many international founders already choose to base their companies in Estonia through e-⁠Residency. They’re drawn by its NATO-level security environment and world-leading digital infrastructure. As Ukrainian e-resident Denys Sobchyshak, CEO of Vidar Systems, put it: “Every time I come to Tallinn, the discussions get bigger, more urgent, and more focused. Estonia makes things happen quickly.” ---------- Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) , Iran itself, however, designates the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) as a terrorist entity The Communist Party of Iran (CPI), founded in 1983 and predominantly active in Kurdish areas. The Organization of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class (Peykar), a Marxist splinter group from the People's Mujahedin of Iran (PMoI). The Labour Party of Iran (Toufan), a Hoxhaist communist party with leadership exiled in Germany People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK/PMOI), which was previously listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. but was delisted in 2012. The MEK is now a prominent exiled political opposition group that advocates for a democratic Iran, and its backers describe it as a viable alternative government ---- https://en.granma.cu/mundo/2025-01-10/cognitive-warfare-or-human-hacking Cognitive warfare, or human hacking Cognitive warfare operations promote and stimulate aversive emotions, thoughts, and moods that can escalate to high levels of intensity Author: Raúl Antonio Capote | informacion@granmai.cu january 10, 2025 07:01:30 Photo: Caricature by Moro The nature of warfare has changed radically. This may seem too categorical a statement, but it is a reality defined by the nature of today's conflicts, shaped by the dizzying evolution of the technological revolution. Military Information Support Operations (MISO), aimed at influencing “enemy” audiences, their emotions, behaviors and motivations, are part of this way of conducting conflict. The term, defined by the Pentagon, replaced PSYOP (Psychological Operation) in 2010, which had been used since World War II. According to the document Warfighting 2040, Cognitive Warfare (CW) “is based on the use of disinformation and propaganda techniques designed to psychologically exhaust the recipients of information.” However, the possibilities of this type of warfare are expanding every day with the advancement of information and disinformation techniques, but especially with the advancement of NBIC (Nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and cognitive science). It is no longer a matter of dominating the five main scenarios of conventional or unconventional warfare (air, land, sea, space, and cyber); now the confrontation is also taking place in the human domain, so that victory will depend on the ability to impose a desired behavior on a selected audience. ---- But this is not entirely new. The work of the U.S. special services to control the human mind began with projects like MKUltra. Also known as Artichoke, this project was a Dantean, chilling reality: experiments in the field of the human unconscious, drug testing, drugs, brain implants, surgery, lobotomy... a whole storehouse of horrors. The task of conducting MKUltra fell in 1953 to the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), an entity founded in 1948 that came to involve more than 30 universities and scientific centers in the country. Among the fields of interest in the research were the development of paranoia, the production of amnesia, the provocation of illogical thoughts through the use of drugs, the manipulation of violence, the study of the effect of ultrasound on human conglomerates, as well as studies on cancer and leukemia. At present, the NBIC revolution is being used to control human beings, turning them into a weapon against themselves. Traditional conditioning techniques have been enhanced and brought to a state of near perfection thanks to the capabilities of neuro-weapons. It is a competition to appropriate our senses, our way of seeing the world, to turn us into puppets in the hands of a select elite that seeks to perpetuate its privileges without spending a bullet. Source: Cognitive Warfare. Unconventional Warfare -------- https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/taxonomy/term/545 Indigenous Approach Podcast: Psychological Operations - Narrative Sat, 01/30/2021 - 1:36pm Col. Jeremy Mushtare is the commander of the 8th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) located at Fort Bragg, NC. 8th POG (A) consists of 3rd PSYOP Battalion (A), 9th PSYOP Battalion (A), and a Headquarters and Headquarters Company. 3rd POB (A) supports operations around the globe with specialized expeditionary teams tailor fit to execute print, A/V, and broadcast activities. The unit also houses the Information Warfare Center and other capabilities designed to support our forces or compete with adversaries from the CONUS base. 9th POB (A) is the PSYOP Regiment’s National Mission Force (NMF) which is responsible for supporting Special Mission Units (SMU) across the world. Members of the PSYOP NMF are deployed specifically to address the most serious threats to U.S. National Security. Dr. Ajit Maan is a narrative strategist focused on national security and international relations. She is founder and CEO of the U.S. based think-tank Narrative Strategies, Affiliated Faculty at George Mason University, member of the Brain Trust of the Weaponized Narrative Initiative of Arizona State University, author of Internarrative Identity: Placing the Self, Counter-Terrorism: Narrative Strategies, and co-editor of Soft Power on Hard Problems: Strategic Influence in Irregular Warfare. Her most recently published book is Plato’s Fear. Lieutenant Colonel (Ret. ---- Brian Steed is an instructor of military history at the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College. Having served in the Middle East for more than eight and a half years as a Foreign Area Officer, he is both a scholar and practitioner of cross-cultural influence. Published works include, among others, ISIS: An Introduction and Guide to the Islamic State and Bees and Spiders: Applied Cultural Awareness and the Art of Cross-Cultural Influence. Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/7keQVZOZ9VNWxwwqtqwj5Z Apple Podcasts: https://t.co/kQMUr4FONu Youtube: https://t.co/mpVD5IV0Qw -------- https://www.researchgate.net/publication/391704397_Cognitive_warfare_-_the_human_mind_as_the_new_battlefield The rise of cognitive warfare has reshaped modern conflict by positioning the human mind as a key battleground. This paper presents a detailed framework for understanding cognitive warfare, distinguishing it from related concepts, including information and psychological warfare. We emphasised the use of advanced technologies, such as AI and neuroscience, to target perception, decision-making, and social cohesion as key methods in executing cognitive warfare. The primary objective of the research was to investigate the socioeconomic , cultural, and psychological vulnerabilities that render specific individuals and communities more susceptible to cognitive operations. The research further investigates the tools and techniques used in cognitive operations alongside strategies for countering their effects. Additionally, it addresses phenomena like captology, which influences cognitive processes without direct manipulation. The findings underscore the critical need for interdisciplinary approaches to confront these challenges and enhance national security, resilience, and policymaking. -=-------------- https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA378002.pdf --------- https://sofsupport.org/cognitive-warfare-to-dominate-and-redefine-adversary-realities-implications-for-u-s-special-operations-forces/ Cognitive Warfare to Dominate and Redefine Adversary Realities: Implications for U.S. Special Operations Forces October 13, 2025 , 2025 DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this work are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position of the U.S. Government, Department of War, United States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations University. This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. Part 1: Cognitive Warfare Foundations Consider the power to dictate who is perceived as “right” or “wrong” in conflicts like the Russia–Ukraine War or Israeli–Gazan conflict, or to reshape the outcome of a nation’s election in the minds of its citizens. Imagine the U.S. and its allies not merely swaying opinions but reconstructing the very reality in which adversaries like North Korea, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Iran, or violent extremists make judgments, aligning their perceptions with U.S. strategic objectives. ---- It is necessary to differentiate cognitive warfare from established concepts such as psychological operations (PSYOPS, sometimes referred to in defense circles as military information support operations [MISO]), information warfare, cyber warfare, and hybrid warfare.⁴ Claverie and du Cluzel write: “Cognitive [w]arfare is where all the elements of information warfare—including the operational aspects of psychology and neurosciences, based on systemics and complexity— combine for military action. It sits at the intersection of two operational fields that hitherto were managed separately: PSYOPS and influence operations (soft power) on the one hand, and cyber operations (cyber defence) intended to degrade or destroy physical information assets on the other. This intersection makes it possible to unite concepts and points of view from different scientific, military, or intelligence communities of interest, bringing about an interdisciplinary approach to how technologies impact humankind.”⁵ See Figure 1. Figure 1. Differences between cognitive warfare and PSYOPS, including, in broad terms, actual psychological operations and other non- kinetic actions such as influence operations and civil–military cooperation. Source: Author (data from Bernard Claverie and François du Cluzel, “The Cognitive Warfare Concept,” NATO Innovation Hub for Allied Command Transformation, 2022, https://innovationhub-act.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/CW-article-Claverie-du-Cluzel-final_0.pdf ) “Cognitive warfare is now with us. The main challenge is that it is essentially invisible; all you see is its impact, and by then … it is often too late.” Cognitive warfare is now seen as its own domain in modern warfare. Alongside the four military domains defined by their environment (land, maritime, air and space) and the cyber domain that connects them all, recent events that upset the geopolitical balance of power have shown how this new warfare domain has emerged and been put to use. It operates on a global stage, since humankind as a whole is now digitally connected. It uses information technology and the tools, machines, networks and systems that come with it. Its target is clear: our intelligence, to be considered both individually and as a group ---------- Bernard Claverie is a University Professor, Honorary Director and Founder of the Ecole Nationale Supérieure de Cognitique at the Bordeaux Institut Polytechnique and a researcher at the Centre National de Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) — UMR5218 — Bordeaux University. 2 - François du Cluzel is a retired Lieutenant-Colonel of the French Army and Head of Innovative Projects within Allied Command Transformation Innovation Hub in Norfolk Virginia. --- the object is to dominate, establish one’s superiority, or even conquer and destroy. Today these practices have reached such a level that political leaders can no longer ignore their importance. The term « Cognitive Warfare » has been used with that meaning in the United States since 2017, to describe in particular the modes of action available to a state or influence group seeking to “manipulate an enemy or its citizenry’s cognition mechanisms in order to weaken, penetrate, influence or even subjugate or destroy it”. While that broad mission has always formed a part of the art of war, here we have a new discipline that requires further elucidation. It is the combination of the newer cyber techniques associated with information warfare and the human components of soft power, along with the manipulation aspects of psychological operations (or PSYOPS). They usually involve a biased presentation of a reality, usually digitally altered, intended to favour one’s own interests. New communication tools now offer infinite possibilities, opening the way to new methods and new objectives. This increased complexity should encourage potential victims to develop a constant posture of resilience, even if in most cases, victims usually realize they were attacked too late. This approach to Cognitive Warfare has caught the eye of armed forces across the world and includes both strategic and operational aspects, some of which are more developed than others. It is not currently covered by established ethical considerations and doctrines. Cognitive Warfare expanded considerably with the arrival of digital strategic decision-making assistants, new operational domains and the invasion of big data and analytics, in the realm of information, wargaming and the conduct of operations. ------- James Giordano is a professor in the Georgetown Department of Neurology in Washington D.C. and the Director of the Neuroethics Studies Programme at the O’Neill-Pellegrino Center for Clinical Bioethics. 4 David Goldfein was a former general and Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, member of the Joint Staff and a military advisor in the Council of National Security and to the Secretary of Defense and President of the United States. 5 Steve Banach is a colonel in the US Army and former director of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Leavenworth (Kansas, USA). 6 Vincent R. Stewart is a former Lieutenant General of the Marine Corps and Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). 7 Gilles Desclaux is a retired Lieutenant General in the French Air Force. He commanded air operations during the war in Lybia and is now a frequent contributor to C2 work being conducted in industry. 8 As defined by Kelly (2011): all the information available to human brains. Dean S. Hartley III Director of Hartley Consulting at Oak Ridge (TN, USA) and honorary president of a number of other consulting firms. 10 Kenneth O. Jobson is a psychiatrist and the creator of the International Psychopharmacology Algorithm, and is particularly active in biotechnologies. ------ Preparing the Future with Mobile Cyber Capabilities. NBIC is a scientific project bringing together four heretofore distinct domains: nanotechnology (nano-robot technology, nano-sensors, nanostructures, energy...), biotechnology (bio-genomic technology, CRISPR-Cas9, neuropharmacology...), information technology (computer science, microelectronics...) and cognitive technology (cognitive science and neuropsychology). The project was formalized with the encouragement of the US Defence Department in 2002 and subsequently taken up by major international institutions and a number of nations, to bring together future technologies. ------ Claverie, B. (2021). Des théories pour la cognition : Différences et Complémentarité des Paradigmes. Paris (France): L’Harmattan. Cole, A., Le Guyader, H., (2020). Cognitive : a 6th Domain of Operations. Norfolk (VA, USA) : Innovation Hub, NATO ACT Edition. Devilliers, L. (2021). "Désinformation : les Armes de l’Intelligence Artificielle". Pour La Science, 523, 26-33. Remanjon, J. (2021), “ Le cerveau sera-t-il l’ultime champ de bataille?”, Revue de la Défense Nationale. Hartley, D.S.III, Jobson, K.O. (2021). Cognitive Superiority: Information to Power. New-York (NY, USA): Springer. Kelly, K. (2011). What technology wants. New York (NY, USA): Penguin Books. ISBN: 978-0143120179. Roco, M.C., Bainbridge, W.S. (2003). Converging Technologies for Improving Human Performance: Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information Technology and Cognitive Science. New-York (NY, USA) : Springer-Verlag. Underwood K. (2017). "Cognitive Warfare Will Be Deciding Factor in Battle: Lt. Gen. Stewart's remarks at DoDIIS17". Signal, The cyber edge. https://www.afcea.org/content/cognitive-warfare- will-be-deciding-factor- battle. https://youtu.be/Nm-lVjRjLD4. Wall, T. (2010). "U.S. Psychological Warfare and Civilian Targeting". Peace Review 22, 3: 288– 294 ----------- These contagions thrive in digital environments where information overload pushes users toward mental shortcuts¹⁵ where echo chambers¹⁶ reinforce existing views and social media algorithms prioritize engagement over accuracy. Psychographic targeting, enabled by troves of user data, allows these cognitive viruses to be tailored with precision¹⁷ to individual psychological profiles.¹⁸ The result is a potent blend of personalization, repetition, and emotional provocation that erodes critical thinking and reshapes the architecture of public perception. Drawing inspiration from quantum mechanics, one might consider a state of “narrative superposition” where multiple contradictory narratives exist simultaneously. The collapse of shared reality’s “waveform” occurs, forcing the adoption of a dominant, desired reality. This parallels work in quantum cognition.¹⁹ Manipulating perception itself can occur through virtual reality, augmented reality, or even targeted neuro-stimulation. While theoretical, these “sensory override” realities could directly influence an individual’s experience and understanding of the world.²⁰ ---- deployment of “cognitive antibodies,” automated systems that intelligently detect and flag manipulated content or suspicious narrative patterns in real time.²⁸ Strategic manipulation may not necessarily target societies broadly or groups generically, but rather individuals specifically.²⁹ This form of warfare would rely on constructing detailed psychographic profiles drawn from exhaustive data, online behaviors, biometric indicators, purchase histories, sleep patterns, even vocal tonality.³⁰ These profiles would then be used to tailor ideological messaging in ways that bypass conscious resistance, tapping into subconscious vulnerabilities, emotional needs, and cognitive biases. See Figure 3. --------- gy advance, it is reasonable to assume that the tools available for manipulating perception will become increasingly powerful. The ability to simulate convincing yet deceptive realities will increase exponentially. The Dormio device is a wearable system developed by scientists at MIT to interact with dreams. It is worn on the hand and uses sensors to track a user’s physiological signs to detect the onset of sleep then deliver targeted audio cues to influence the content of dreams in the hypnagogic state (Source: “Dormio: Interfacing with Dreams,” MIT Media Lab, accessed September 22, 2025, https:// www.media.mit.edu/projects/sleep-creativity/overview/). Photo by Oscar Rosello. Proactive epistemic sovereignty safeguards are crucial and involve the implementation of national policies and investment in domestic epistemic infrastructures, such as public broadcasters and independent research institutions. Simultaneously, international norm development for cognitive security will become increasingly necessary, aiming to establish clear norms, agreements, and “red lines” for acceptable and unacceptable cognitive influence operations, including developing shared attribution mechanisms for malign activities. ---------- Implications for U.S. Special Operations Forces U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are currently not trained, organized, or equipped for a future dominated by cognitive warfare. While U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), theater special operations commands (TSOCs), and their subordinate units have command surgeons focused on physical health, for example, they lack neuroscientists, behavioral scientists, cognitive psychologists, or cognitive engineers who could help understand, shape, project, and defend against operations aimed at the human mind.³⁹ Operational teams deploy with state-of-the-art satellite communications equipment to relay battlefield information across continents, yet they do not possess the equivalent “cognitive toolkits,” such as advanced brain-computer interfaces, intelligent psychological monitoring systems like smart sensor bracelets that track emotional states in real time, or tools to disrupt adversarial narratives.⁴⁰ This personal erosion of objectivity mirrors broader vulnerabilities, where cognitive warfare exploits human biases—such as the U.S.’s “WEIRD” (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, democratic)⁴¹ psychological profile—to sow doubt and division, leaving forces like SOF ill-prepared to counter such threats. A small SOF team deployed overseas might find itself unknowingly outmaneuvered by malign narratives, deepfake videos portraying U.S. troops committing atrocities, viral rumors discrediting local leaders aligned with the U.S., or psychological campaigns designed to fracture trust within allied forces. -------- Cognitive warfare has the potential to redefine not only adversarial realities but also the operational effectiveness of U.S. SOF. Concepts ranging from cognitive contagions and personalized influence to counter-cognitive defenses and SOF-specific offensive applications underscore a reality: The battlefield of the future is increasingly mental. By integrating cognitive warfare into SOF’s training, equipping, and organizational frameworks, the U.S. can leverage the unique capabilities of special operators to defend against malign influence and offensively shape adversary perceptions, ensuring strategic dominance in the cognitive domain. Admittedly, the human mind remains a “black box;” (46) and many ideas presented here are speculative, rooted in the logical extrapolation of current technological and cognitive trends. Some of these ideas admittedly seem far-fetched, the things of science fiction. With that thinking, one option might be to dismiss the concepts outlined above. By not exploring possibilities now, however, we ensure that America and its partners remain steps behind malign actors that are already experimenting in this space. For these reasons, America should instead take the possibilities in cognitive warfare seriously, and experiment now. Resilience in defense and creativity in cognitive warfare offense may well define the future relevance and dominance of America, including its most agile military assets. About the Author Jeremiah “Lumpy” Lumbaca, PhD, is a retired U.S. Army Green Beret and current professor of irregular warfare, counterterrorism, and special operations with the Department of Defense. He can be found on X/Twitter @LumpyAsia. Notes 1. Bernard Claverie and François du Cluzel, “The Cognitive Warfare Concept,” NATO Innovation Hub for Allied Command Transformation, 2022, https://innovationhub-act.org/ wp-content/uploads/2023/12/CW-article-Claverie-du-Cluzel-final_0.pdf. 2. “Cognitive Warfare,” NATO Allied Command Transformation, accessed July 3, 2025, https://www.act.nato.int/activities/cognitive-warfare/. 3. Robin Burda, “Cognitive Warfare as Part of Society: Never-Ending Battle for Minds” in Paper Series: Information-Based Behavioural Influencing and Western Practice, eds. Arthur Laudrain, Laura Jasper, and Michel Rademaker (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2023), https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/04- Cognitive_Warfare_as_Part_of_Society__Never_Ending_Battle_for_Minds.pdf. 4. Johns Hopkins University and Imperial College London, “Countering Cognitive Warfare: Awareness and Resilience,” NATO Review, May 20, 2021, https://www.nato.int/docu/ review/articles/2021/05/20/countering-cognitive-warfare-awareness-and-resilience/ index.html. 5. Claverie and du Cluzel, “The Cognitive Warfare Concept.” 6. Martin C. Libicki, What Is Information Warfare? (National Defense University, 1995), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA367662. 7. Alina Bârgăoanu and Flavia Durach, “Cognitive Warfare: Understanding the Threat,” in Routledge Handbook of Disinformation and National Security, eds. Rubén Arcos, Irene Chiru, and Cristina Ivan (Routledge, 2023): 221–236, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003190363. 8. Sarah Bradshaw and Philip N. Howard, “The Global Organization of Social Media Disinformation Campaigns,” Journal of International Affairs 71, no. 1.5 (2018): 23–32. 9. Hany Farid, “Creating, Using, Misusing, and Detecting Deep Fakes,” Journal of Online Trust and Safety 1, no. 4 (2022): 1–33, https://doi.org/10.54501/jots.v1i4.56. 10. James Giordano, ed., Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense: Practical Considerations, Neuroethical Concerns (CRC Press, 2014), https://doi.org/10.1201/b17454. 11. Ying-Yu Lin, “China’s Cognitive Warfare Against Taiwan and Taiwan’s Countermeasures,” Taiwan Strategists, no. 20, 37–54, https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail? DocID=P20220613001-N202312210022-00003; Michael J. Mazarr et al., Hostile Social Manipulation: Present Realities and Emerging Trends (RAND Corporation, 2019), https:// www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2713.html. 12. Claverie and du Cluzel, “The Cognitive Warfare Concept.” 13. P.W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking, LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media (Eamon Dolan/Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018); Anton Kühberger “The Framing of Decisions: A New Look at Old Problems,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 62, no. 2 (1995): 230–240, https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1995.1046. 14. Cass R. Sunstein, On Rumors: How Falsehoods Spread, Why We Believe Them, and What Can Be Done (Princeton University Press, 2014). 15. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011). 16. Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You (Penguin Press, 2011). 17. Muhammed Haroon et al., “YouTube, The Great Radicalizer? Auditing and Mitigating Ideological Biases in YouTube Recommendations,” March 20, 2022, https:// doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2203.10666. 18. The Great Hack, directed by Karim Amer and Jehane Noujaim (2019, Noujaim Films and The Othrs), Netflix. 19. Jerome R. Busemeyer and Peter D. Bruza, Quantum Models of Cognition and Decision (Cambridge University Press, 2012), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511997716. 20. Michael Madary and Thomas K. Metzinger, “Real Virtuality: A Code of Ethical Conduct. Recommendations for Good Scientific Practice and the Consumers of VR-Technology,” Front. Robot. AI, no. 3 (2016): 1–23. 21. Laura Garcia and Tommy Shane, “A Guide to Prebunking: A Promising Way to Inoculate Against Misinformation,” First Draft News, last reviewed June 29, 2021, archived August 25, 2025, at https://web.archive.org/web/20240715231600/https://firstdraftnews.org/ articles/a-guide-to-prebunking-a-promising-way-to-inoculate-against- misinformation/#expand. 22. William J. McGuire, “Some Contemporary Approaches,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 1 (1964): 191–229, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60052-0. 23. Eliza Mackintosh and Edward Kiernan, “Finland Is Winning the War on Fake News. What It’s Learned May Be Crucial to Western Democracy,” CNN, May 2015, https:// edition.cnn.com/interactive/2019/05/europe/finland-fake-news-intl/. 24. “Media Literacy and Education in Finland,” Finland Toolbox, March 12, 2024, https:// toolbox.finland.fi/life-society/media-literacy-and-education-in-finland/. 25. Benjamin Laufer and Helen Nissenbaum, “Algorithmic Displacement of Social Trust,” in Optimizing for What? Algorithmic Amplification and Society (Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, 2023), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4734544. 26. Ferenc Huszár et al., “Algorithmic Amplification of Politics on Twitter,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 119, no. 1 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1073/ pnas.2025334119. 27. Tyrone C. Gubler, “The White-Hat Bot: A Novel Botnet Defense Strategy” (master’s thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2012), https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/1113. 28. AIT Staff Writer, “Adversarial Machine Learning in Detecting Inauthentic Behavior on Social Platforms,” AIThority, May 7, 2025, https://aithority.com/machine-learning/ adversarial-machine-learning-in-detecting-inauthentic-behavior-on-social-platforms/. 29. Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power (PublicAffairs, 2019). 30. Michal Kosinski et al., “Private Traits and Attributes Are Predictable from Digital Records of Human Behavior,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110, no. 15 (2013), https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1218772110. 31. James Paul Gee, “What Video Games Have to Teach Us About Learning and Literacy,” Computers in Entertainment 1, no. 1 (2003): 20, https://doi.org/10.1145/950566.950595. 32. Chris Dede, “Immersive Interfaces for Engagement and Learning,” Science 323, no. 5910 (2009): 66–69, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1167311. 33. Miles Brundage et al., “The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation,” Scholarly Works – Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities (Apollo – University of Cambridge Repository, 2018), https:// doi.org/10.17863/CAM.22520. 34. Manoel Horta Ribeiro et al., “Auditing Radicalization Pathways on YouTube,” paper presented at the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, January 2020, 131–141, https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372879. 35. Onora O’Neill, host, The Reith Lectures: A Question of Trust, BBC, 2002, https:// www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00ghvd8/episodes/player. 36. Jane R. Garrison et al., “Monitoring What Is Real: The Effects of Modality and Action on Accuracy and Type of Reality Monitoring Error,” Cortex; A Journal Devoted to the Study of the Nervous System and Behavior 87 (2017): 108–117, https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.cortex.2016.06.018. 37. Lucas Kello, The Virtual Weapon and International Order (Yale University Press, 2017), https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1trkjd1. 38. Marie Battiste, “Cognitive Imperialism,” in Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory, ed. Michael A. Peters (Springer Singapore, 2017), 183–188, https:// doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-588-4_501. 39. Andrew MacDonald and Ryan Ratcliffe, “Cognitive Warfare: Maneuvering in the Human Dimension,” Proceedings 149, no. 4 (2023): 1,442, https://www.usni.org/magazines/ proceedings/2023/april/cognitive-warfare-maneuvering-human-dimension. 40. Josh Baughman and Peter W. Singer, “China Gears Up for Cognitive Warfare,” Defense One, April 7, 2023, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2023/04/china-gears-cognitive- warfare/384876/; Brian Godwin, “From Perception to Protection: Countering Cognitive Warfare in the U.S. Army” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2023), https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/p4013coll2/id/4112/ download. 41. Joseph Henrich, The Weirdest People in the World: How the West Became Psychologically Peculiar and Particularly Prosperous (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2020). 42. Statement Before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services (2024) (statement of Commander General Michael E. Langley, U.S. Africa Command). 43. Babak Taghvaee, “Iran’s Use of Psychological Warfare Against Its Adversaries and Strategies for Deterrence,” Middle East Quarterly 32, no. 3 (2025), https:// www.meforum.org/meq/irans-use-of-psychological-warfare-against-its-adversaries- and-strategies-for-deterrence. 44. Elina Treyger, Joe Cheravitch, and Raphael S. Cohen, Russian Disinformation Efforts on Social Media (RAND Corporation, 2022), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/ RR4373z2.html. 45. Austin Branch et al., “America Is Being Out-Gunned in Cognitive Warfare,” Information Professionals Association, June 23, 2025, https://information-professionals.org/america- is-being-out-gunned-in-cognitive-warfare/. 46. “Prying Open the Black Box of the Brain,” U.S. National Science Foundation, June 12, 2013, https://www.nsf.gov/news/prying-open-black-box-brain. --------- https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/hrw/2005/en/95118 During Saddam Hussein's last year in power, some Iranians held in Abu Ghraib prison were repatriated to Iran in exchange for Iraqi prisoners of war (POWs). These were dissident members of the MKO who had been sent by the organization for "safekeeping" in Abu Ghraib.6 The release of these prisoners in 2002-2003 provided a direct window into conditions inside the MKO camps that was previously inaccessible to the outside world. Human Rights Watch interviewed five of these former MKO members who were held in Abu Ghraib prison. Their testimonies, together with testimonies collected from seven other former MKO members, paint a grim picture of how the organization treated its members, particularly those who held dissenting opinions or expressed an intent to leave the organization. The former MKO members reported abuses ranging from detention and persecution of ordinary members wishing to leave the organization, to lengthy solitary confinements, severe beatings, and torture of dissident members. The MKO held political dissidents in its internal prisons during the 1990s and later turned over many of them to Iraqi authorities, who held them in Abu Ghraib. In one case, Mohammad Hussein Sobhani was held in solitary confinement for eight-and-a-half years inside the MKO camps, from September 1992 to January 2001. The witnesses reported two cases of deaths under interrogation. Three dissident members – Abbas Sadeghinejad, Ali Ghashghavi, and Alireza Mir Asgari – witnessed the death of a fellow dissident, Parviz Ahmadi, inside their prison cell in Camp Ashraf. Abbas Sadeghinejad told Human Rights Watch that he also witnessed the death of another prisoner, Ghorbanali Torabi, after Torabi was returned from an interrogation session to a prison cell that he shared with Sadeghinejad. The MKO's leadership consists of the husband and wife team of Masoud and Maryam Rajavi. Their marriage in 1985 was hailed by the organization as the beginning of a permanent "ideological revolution."7 Various phases of this "revolution" include: divorce by decree of married couples, regular writings of self-criticism reports, renunciation of sexuality, and absolute mental and physical dedication to the leadership.8 The level of devotion expected of members was in stark display in 2003 when the French police arrested Maryam Rajavi in Paris. In protest, ten MKO members and sympathizers set themselves on fire in various European cities; two of them subsequently died.9 Former members cite the implementation of the "ideological revolution" as a major source of the psychological and physical abuses committed against the group's members. At present, the MKO is listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department and several European governments. The MKO's leadership is engaged in an extensive campaign aimed at winning support from Western politicians in order to have the designation of a terrorist organization removed.10 -------- For a comprehensive history of the organization, see Ervand Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). [2] Camp Ashraf is located near the city of al-Khalis, north of Baghdad. [3] Human Rights Watch e-mail interview with U.S. military officials, March 10, 2005. [4] According to U.S. military sources, twenty-eight members were repatriated in December 2004, thirteen in January 2005, 100 on March 3, 2005, and 132 on March 9, 2005. [5] "US grants protection for anti-Tehran group in Iraq," Reuters, 26 July, 2004. [6] Former MKO members who were held in Abu Ghraib prison told Human Rights Watch that their cell doors bore a plaque with "Mojahedin Safekeeping" [Amanat-e Mojahedin] written on it. [7] Mojahed, No. 241, April 4, 1985. Mojahed is the official publication of the MKO, and at the time it appeared weekly. [8] See Masoud Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel (London: Saqi Books, 2004). On self-criticism sessions, see pp. 210-230; on decreeing of divorce, see pgs. 307-311; on renunciation of sexuality, see pages 313-340. Immediately following Masoud and Maryam Rajavi's marriage, the MKO military command issued a directive stating: "In order to carry out your organizational duties under the present circumstances there is an urgent need to strengthen and deepen this ideological revolution. You must pay the necessary price by allocating sufficient time and resources for absorbing related teachings ... " Mojahed, No. 242, April 12, 1985. The Social Division of MKO also issued a directive to the members stating: "To understand this great revolution ... is to understand and gain a deep insight into the greatness of our new leadership, meaning leadership of Masoud and Maryam. It is to believe in them as well as to show ideological and revolutionary obedience of them." Mojahed, No. 242, April 12, 1985. [9] Arifa Akbar, "Human torches mark protest; 10 Iranian exiles become fireballs, two die martyrs," The Independent, July 2, 2003. [10] Maryam Rajavi, "Empower Iran's opposition forces checking the Mullahs," International Herald Tribune, January 28, 2005. Katherine Shrader, "Iranian Group Seeks Legitimacy in U.S.," Associated Press, February 24, 2005. [11] Farhad Javaheri-Yar, Ali Ghashghavi, Mohammad Hussein Sobhani, and Akbar Akbari were repatriated by Iraqi officials to Iran on January 21, 2002. Amir Mowaseghi was repatriated on March 18, 2003. Alireza Mir Asgari was abandoned along the Iran-Iraq border in February 2003. Yasser Ezati left Iraq in June 2004. Abbas Sadeghinejad escaped the MKO military camp on June 20, 2002. [12] Mohammad Reza Eskandari, Tahereh Eskandari, Habib Khorrami, and Karim Haqi. [13] Farhad Javaheri-Yar, Ali Ghashghavi, Mohammad Hussein Sobhani, Akbar Akbari, and Amir Mowaseghi were imprisoned in Abu Ghraib. [14] "For the first time in the history of the Iranian people's liberation struggle, an organization with a monolithic ideology, populist ideals, and a policy of revolutionary armed resistance was founded in September 1965." Mojahedin Khalq Organization Bonyangozaran, downloaded on March 10, 2005, http://www.iran.mojahedin.org/books.htm . See alsoErvand Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven: Yale University Press), 1989. [15] Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, p. 89. [16] Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, [17] "Iran: Violations of Human Rights 1987-1990," Amnesty International, Index: MDE 13/2/90. [18] "Iran: Political Executions," Amnesty International, December 1988, Index: MDE 13/29/88. See also Ayatollah Montazeri's letters protesting summary executions in 1988, published in his memoirs. Ayatollah Montazeri was Ayatollah Khomeini's heir apparent in 1988. Ayatollah Montazeri, Khaterat, http://www.montazeri.ws/farsi/khaterat/fehrest.htm , last accessed March 18, 2005. [19] Among the most spectacular attacks include the bombing of the IRP headquarters in June 28, 1981 and the assassination of President Mohammad Ali Rajai and Prime Minister Mohammad Javad Bahonar in 1981. [20] "Khomeini's Foes Split," Washington Post, April 4, 1984. [21] Mojahed, No. 240, March 14, 1985. [22] Masoud Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel (London: Saqi Books, 2004), p. 219. Masoud Banisadr is a relative of former president Abolhasan Banisadr. [23] Mojahed, No. 241, April 4, 1985. [24] See footnote 8. [25] Mojahed, No. 242, April 12, 1985. [26] Ibid. [27] "Iran rebels form Iraq-based army," Chicago Sun-Times, June 20, 1987. [28] "Iran accepts UN truce call in eight year war with Iraq," Associated Press, July 19, 1988. [29] Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, p. 283. [30] "Incursion by rebels threaten cease-fire," The Washington Post, July 30, 1988. [31] "Rebels routed in push for Tehran," The Guardian, September 6, 1988. [32] Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, p. 292. [33] Mohammad Reza Eskandari, Bar Ma Che Gozasht Khaterat Yek Mojahed (Paris: Kahvaran, 2004), p. 83. [34] Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, p. 306. [35] The concept of ideological revolution started with the "ideological marriage" of Masoud and Maryam Rajavi in 1985. Subsequently, the organization required all of its members to make an "ideological leap" by cleansing their character. This process required all members to write self-criticism reports outlining their character flaws and past mistakes. See footnote 8. [36] Imam Zaman is the twelfth Shia Imam. According to the Shia Twelver belief, Imam Zaman is the Twelfth Imam in descent from the prophet Mohammad, who went into "occultation" in the Tenth century and will reappear on earth as a messiah at a time of God's choosing. [37] Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, p. 307. [38] Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, p. 311. [39] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Farhad Javaheri-Yar, February 3, 2005. [40] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Alireza Mir Asgari, February 10, 2005. [41] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Karim Haqi, February 11, 2005. [42] Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Mohammad Reza Eskandari and Tahereh Eskandari, February 1, 2005 and February 10, 2005. [43] Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, p. 388. [44] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Abbas Sadeghinejad, February 14, 2005. Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Ali Ghashghavi, February 9, 2005 and May 6, 2005. Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Alireza Mir Asgari, February 10, 2005. [45] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Abbas Sadeghinejad, February 14, 2005. [46] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Alireza Mir Asgari, February 10, 2005. [47] Mojahed, No. 380, March 2, 1998 (on file with Human Rights Watch). [48] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Abbas Sadeghinejad, February 14, 2005. [49] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Mohammad Hussein Sobhani, February 14, 2005 and May 6, 2005. [50] Ibid. [51] Ibid. [52] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Yasser Ezati, February 9, 2005. [53] Ibid. [54] Ibid. [55] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Farhad Javaheri-Yar, February 3, 2005 and February 25, 2005. [56] Ibid. [57] Ibid. [58] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Ali Ghashghavi, February 9, 2005 and May 6, 2005. [59] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Alireza Mir Asgari, February 10, 2005. [60] Ibid. [61] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Akbar Akbari, February 27, 2005 and May 6, 2005. [62] Ibid. [63] Ibid. [64] Bid. [65] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Seyd Amir Mowaseghi, February 4, 2005. [66] Ibid. ----------- https://www.goarmysof.army.mil/PO/#:~:text=BENEFITS%20OF%20A%20PSYCHOLOGICAL%20OPERATIONS%20CAREER&text=PSYOP%20Soldiers%20PCS%20less%20than,located%20on%20Fort%20Liberty%2C%20NC. PSYOP Soldiers are assessed and selected for their intellect, critical and analytical thinking skills, adaptability and mental resilience. They analyze operational environments, physical targets and target audiences; advise on psychological effects; plan influence options; develop actions and messages targeting psychological vulnerabilities; deliver optimally timed actions and messages; and assess influence effectiveness. Operating in small, autonomous teams, PSYOP units conduct military information support operations; Department of Defense deception activities; build partner influence capacity; and, when called upon by the President, provide civil authority information support. The PSYOP mission set takes its teams into hostile, denied and politically sensitive environments. PSYOP teams provide strategic, operational, and tactical options to the theater combatant commanders, joint force commanders, or ambassadors that employ them. The array of employment opportunities, combined with the tactical techniques and equipment utilized, define a unit and mission unlike any other on the battlefield. Basic Airborne and Jumpmaster Courses SERE Level C (High Risk) Course Advanced influence skills and techniques Special Operations Military Deception Planner’s Course MISO Program Design and Assessment Course Special Warfare Network Development Course Special Warfare Operational Design Course Live Environment Training (Language Immersion) Advanced Civilian Education Programs Training with Industry (TWI) Program + Many More --------- Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Information Quality No Fear Act DOD Open Government DOD Plain Writing --- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_Baharia Camp Baharia, also known as Dreamland or FOB Volturno, was a U.S. military installation that was just outside the city of Fallujah, Iraq. It was the smaller of two major U.S. military bases maintained just outside the Fallujah city limits, during the Iraq War. ------ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_Fallujah#:~:text=The%20camp%20is%20adjacent%20to%20the%20other,firing%20from%20Camp%20Fallujah%2C%20Iraq%20in%202004. Camp Fallujah (formerly known as the MEK (Mujahedin-E Khalq) Compound) is a large compound in Fallujah, Iraq formerly used by the U.S. Army and U.S. Marines from 2004 to 2009 and now used by the Iraqi Ground Forces. ----