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Supplementary data zsab008_suppl_Supplementary_Material - docx file Study Objectives To synthesize original articles exploring the effects of sleep restriction on cognitive performance specifically for Elite Cognitive Performers, i.e. those who engage in cognitively demanding tasks with critical or safety-critical outcomes in their occupation or area of expertise. Methods Backward snowballing techniques, gray literature searches, and traditional database searches (Embase, MEDLINE, Web of Science, Google Scholar, PSYCinfo, and SportDiscus) were used to obtain relevant articles. A quality assessment was performed, and the risk of training effects was considered. Results were narratively synthesized. Fourteen articles fit the criteria. Cognitive outcomes were divided into three categories defined by whether cognitive demands were “low-salience,” “high-salience stable,” or “high-salience flexible.” Results Low-salience tests (i.e. psychomotor vigilance tasks & serial reaction tests), mainly requiring vigilance and rudimentary attentional capacities, were sensitive to sleep restriction, however, this did not necessarily translate to significant performance deficits on low-salience occupation-specific task performance. High-salience cognitive outcomes were typically unaffected unless when cognitive flexibility was required. Conclusions Sleep restriction is of particular concern to occupations whereby individuals perform (1) simple, low-salience tasks or (2) high-salience tasks with demands on the flexible allocation of attention and working memory, with critical or safety-critical outcomes. --------- https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/31096123/ Effects of sleep extension on cognitive/motor performance and motivation in military tactical athletes Bradley M Ritland 1 , Guido Simonelli 2 , Rodolphe J Gentili 3 , J Carson Smith 4 , Xin He 5 , Janna Mantua 6 , Thomas J Balkin 7 , Bradley D Hatfield 8 Objective: Investigate the immediate and residual impacts of sleep extension in tactical athletes. Methods: A randomized controlled trial (Sleep extension = EXT vs Control = CON) was conducted on 50 (EXT: 20.12 ± 2.01 years vs CON: 19.76 ± 1.09 years) tactical athletes enrolled in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC). Participants wore actigraphs for 15 consecutive nights and completed a cognitive/motor battery after seven habitual sleep nights, after four sleep extension nights, and after the resumption of habitual sleep for four nights. The CON group remained on habitual sleep schedules for the entire study. Results: During the intervention, the EXT group significantly increased mean sleep time (1.36 ± 0.71 h, p < 0.001). After sleep extension, there were significant between-group differences on the mean score change since baseline in Psychomotor Vigilance Test (PVT) reaction time (p = 0.026), Trail Making Test (TMT) - B time (p = 0.027), standing broad jump (SBJ) distance (p < 0.001), and motivation levels [to perform the cognitive tasks (p = 0.003) and the SBJ (p = 0.009)]; with the EXT group showing a greater enhancement in performance/motivation. After resuming habitual sleep schedules, significant between-group differences on the mean score change since baseline persisted on SBJ distance (p = 0.001) and motivation to perform the SBJ (p = 0.035), with the EXT showing greater enhancement in performance/motivation. Conclusion: Increasing sleep duration in military tactical athletes resulted in immediate performance benefits in psychomotor vigilance, executive functioning, standing broad jump distance, and motivation levels. Benefits on motor performance were evident four days after resumption of habitual sleep schedules. Military tactical athletes aiming to optimize their overall performance should consider the impact of longer sleep durations when feasible. Keywords: Cognitive/motor performance; Military; Motivation; Sleep extension; Tactical athletes. ---------- https://baltdefcol.org/education/cyber-defence-policy-course Cyber Defence Policy Course on National and International Levels Cyber Defence Policy Course on National and International Levels REGISTRATION for the next course: 09-13 March 2026 The aim is to provide course participants with the conceptual framework to facilitate strategic thinking about cyber defence and develop an understanding of how to integrate cyber considerations into national and international security policy and strategy formulation. Description The course will underscore the multidimensional character of cyber defence through specific lessons learned from the war in Ukraine. Guest speakers representing diverse opinions from the political, military, academic, and private sectors will stress the importance of the comprehensive approach and cross-sector cooperation for strengthening cybersecurity on national and international levels during peace and war. The course is scheduled for March 09-13, 2026, in Tartu, Estonia, and will be delivered in English. A standard iteration consists of the residential session as well as e-learning. Learning Outcomes The training will provide the participants with basic skills and knowledge to analyse and design proper policy frameworks and strategies for cyber defence. The curriculum has been designed to provide an integrated overview of contemporary geopolitical affairs and security issues to enable students to think creatively and critically about issues of strategic importance. Quote key features of the modern/future security environment. Define the cyber domain as a key enabler and tool of hybrid warfare. Define the validity of cyberspace in the creation, storage, modification, exchange and exploitation of information. Assess the role of cyber defence in national and international security contexts - Determine the appropriate measures to ensure national security in the digital era. Define the dependency of the military domain on communication and information systems & networks. Define the growing role of cyberspace as a web of critical assets and its relation to national security. Understand basic technological aspects of cybersecurity. Classify the instruments of national power and relate them to the effects of cyberspace. Analyze the strategic aspects of cyber security in the national security environment. Apply cyberspace terminology, concepts, issues, and components. Relate cybersecurity considerations with the information environment. Analyze various aspects of cybersecurity and relate their effects to national security. Evaluate cyberspace policies and generate strategic concepts and approaches to cyber defence. Administration Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Costs: There is no course fee, but participants are to bear the cost of their travel, meals and lodging. Dress Code: Military personnel—Field Uniforms; Civilians—Casual Upon finishing the course, each participant will receive a certificate. Useful Information Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Costs: There is no course fee, but participants are to bear the cost of their travel, meals and lodging. Dress Code: Military personnel—Field Uniforms; Civilians—Casual Upon finishing the course, each participant will receive a certificate. POC ESDC Cyber ETEE Training Manager Ms Anna Malec Anna.Malec@eeas.europa.eu Course Office Ms Kaie Ehrenberg kaie.ehrenberg@baltdefcol.org ------------- https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/year-2025-cognitive-domain-operations-total-defence-cyber-svantesson-5bjzc/ The year of 2025 – Cognitive domain operations, total defence, cyber militias, and data localisation Dan Jerker B. Svantesson The threat of ‘cognitive domain operations’ In December, the US Department of Defense released the 2024 edition of annual report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. One of the many important observations made in the Report, relates to how the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) concept of “cognitive domain operations” (CDO) combines psychological warfare with cyber operations to shape the behaviour and decision-making of China’s adversaries: “The PLA has recognized the importance of incorporating emerging technologies, such as AI, big data, brain science, and neuroscience into CDO as the PLA perceives that these technologies will lead to profound changes in the ability to subvert human cognition. The goal of CDO is to achieve what the PLA refers to as “mind dominance,” which the PLA defines as the use of information to influence public opinion to affect change in a nation’s social system, likely to create an environment favorable to the PRC and reduce civilian and military resistance to PLA actions. The PLA probably intends to use CDO as an asymmetric capability to deter U.S. or third-party entry into a potential conflict, or as an offensive capability to shape perceptions or polarize a society. Authoritative PLA documents describe one aspect of deterrence as the ability to bring about psychological pressure and fear on an opponent and force them to surrender. PLA articles on CDO state that seizing mind dominance in the cognitive domain and subduing the enemy without fighting is the highest realm of warfare.” (p. 38) At a time when countries such as China are increasing their efforts to influence our societies, we must ask whether we in the democratic countries in the world are doing enough to protect ourselves. In this context, I note the debates about Australia’s abandoned Communications Legislation Amendment (Combatting Misinformation and Disinformation) Bill 2024 as well as the fact that the US closed down its Global Engagement Center on 23 December. Up until then, the Global Engagement Center worked to “direct, lead, synchronize, integrate, and coordinate U.S. Federal Government efforts to recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at undermining or influencing the policies, security, or stability of the United States, its allies, and partner nations.”. An important task indeed. ---------- The necessity of a ‘whole-of-society’ approach to cyber defence During the Cold War, Sweden relied on its ‘totalförsvar’ concept and work is now ongoing to resuscitate this structure. Totalförsvar is commonly translated in a literal way as ‘total defence’. However, that term lacks a natural meaning in English, and a more informative translation may be found in the phrase ‘whole-of-society defence’. Essentially the idea is that the defence of a State is thea literal way as ‘total defence’. However, that term lacks a natural meaning in English, and a more informative translation may be found in the phrase ‘whole-of-society defence’. Essentially the idea is that the defence of a State is a task for everyone. Thus, the ‘total defence’ consists of both military activities (military defence) and civilian activities (civil defence). Total defence includes authorities, organisations, private individuals and companies. This means that all of Sweden's residents are affected by total defence and are part of Sweden's defence. At any rate, if the ‘total defence’ thinking was (merely) a smart strategy in the past, with a cyber-dominated society, it is now an absolute necessity. Cyber is a whole-of-society issue, and the defence of cyber needs a whole-of-society approach. Consequently, we need to see a whole-of-society approach to defence in all democratic States. ----- https://mil.ee/en/landforces/cyber-command/ Cyber Command The main mission of the Cyber Command is to carry out operations in cyberspace in order to provide command support for Ministry of Defence’s area of responsibility. Mission essential Tasks Provide information and communication technology infrastructure and services Provide cyber defence Plan and execute cyber operations Gain, maintain and share cyberspace situation awareness Plan and execute information operations Provide Headquarters support for Joint Headquarters Plan and execute strategic communicatons Train, prepare and mobilize wartime and reserve units Conduct functional area Training, Research and Development Cyber Command reservists training Contacts Cyber Command Juhkentali 58 15007 Tallinn Estonia +372 717 1652 kubervaejuhatus@mil.ee facebook.com/kybervaejuhatus Press and Media contact Second Lieutenant Hannes Parmo Public Affairs Officer of Cyber Command +372 5346 4972 hannes.parmo@mil.ee ------------ https://www.tehnopol.ee/en/category/dual-use-and-defence-technologies/ 578 applications, 115+ companies and €12.8 million raised – Tehnopol Startup Incubator 2025 wrap-up The new year is already well underway and the next cohort of specialised accelerator programmes is about to kick off. Before 2026 fully gains momentum, it’s a good moment to look back: what did 2025 look like for Tehnopol Startup Incubator, and – most importantly – what kind of impact did it have on our startups and the wider ecosystem? 2025 was a fast-paced year by the numbers. We received 578 applications across our accelerator programmes, and 115+ companies joined our programmes during the year. A clear trend is that new cohorts are becoming more mature from day one: teams enter the programme with sharper focus, more realistic market validation and a clearer development roadmap. ----------- execute alongside ambition – both in product development and in investor readiness. The Incubator’s own capacity grew as well. Our team expanded to 11 people, with three new colleagues joining in 2025, enabling us to strengthen programme delivery, community building and the development of new strategic directions. The Incubator’s recommendation score (NPS) reached 97.1. Diverse programmes and several “firsts” In 2025, we ran multiple accelerators and development programmes in parallel, including a technology-agnostic accelerator, the Film & Multimedia Accelerator, the AI Accelerator, the Cyber Accelerator, the NATO DIANA Estonia Accelerator, the Defence pre-accelerator, and several Estonia-focused programmes. In addition, the AI development programme started a new period in January 2025 (running until 2027), during which we will support 40 companies using AI technologies. The year also brought several milestone “firsts”: Defence Innovation Day – the Incubator’s very first conference, which opened Estonia’s first-ever Estonian Defence Week. Defence Business Lab – a new-format defence pre-accelerator programme that concluded with a Demo Day. Foreign Founders Meetup – community events commissioned by EIS for international founders residing in Estonia. The first Film & Multimedia Accelerator hackathon in Jõhvi, bringing together 90+ participants and helping shape several strong teams and ideas. --------- Film & Multimedia Accelerator: strengthening structure and impact For the Film & Multimedia Accelerator, 2025 was primarily a year of deepening impact and partnerships. We contributed to several sector events and panel discussions, including talks and panels as part of the kood/Jõhvi JobFair, activities at sTARTUp Day, bringing an international speaker to Jõhvi Film Day, the Film & Multimedia Tech Hackathon, and representation at PÖFF Industry. Collaboration strengthened with IDA Hub, PÖFF, kood/Jõhvi and BFM, with a clear goal: building real bridges between the creative and technology sectors. A key step was the partnership agreement between BFM and the Tehnopol Film & Multimedia Accelerator, making it possible to complete an entrepreneurship internship within the accelerator. In 2025, the Film & Multimedia Accelerator also launched an Advisory Board for the first time, adding strategic guidance and diverse perspectives (including well-known experts such as Tiina Lokk and Kaupo Karelson). Defence and dual-use: consistently full rooms and strong results Interest in defence and dual-use innovation remained very high in 2025. Several events – such as the DIANA kick-off event, the Defence pre-accelerator info session, community coffee mornings, Demo Day, new-call webinars, and Estonian Defence Week events (including regional meetups) – were sold out or extremely popular online. DIANA-related topics were also consistently visible in our communications throughout the year. Importantly, strong interest translated into strong outcomes. In 2025, three Estonian companies were selected for the NATO DIANA accelerator (Spacedrip, C2Grid and LSMedical; C2Grid also completed the defence pre-accelerator). The performance of the NATO DIANA Estonia Accelerator improved as well: 3 out of 7 companies advanced to Phase 2, resulting in a 42.86% success rate (up from 33.33% in 2024). NATO DIANA Estonia Accelerator companies were also the most active users of mentoring, with mentoring rated 4–5 out of 5 and overall satisfaction at 9.57 out of 10. Startup highlights that stood out in 2025 Several teams made notable progress during the year: Wayren secured a €7.9 million strategic investment from defence industry company EFA Group. Lobster Robotics’ underwater robots were adopted by the Royal Netherlands Navy in 2025 (after earlier testing with the Estonian Navy). Defence pre-accelerator team Thistle made strong strides internationally through sales, partnerships and testing across multiple markets. From the Cyber Accelerator, Askara AI Solutions began cooperation with defence industry prime Thales. Film & Multimedia Accelerator teams also moved forward visibly – for example, SyncHub gained its first paying customer, StudioStack grew its user base, and several teams increased their visibility through pitching opportunities and stage appearances. Looking ahead to 2026 2026 brings several major next steps: a Deep Tech programme in preparation with universities and Sparkup Tartu Science Park, continued growth in defence and dual-use activities (including new accelerators and hackathons), and in the creative sector, a shift toward deeper integration of AI – from individual tools to end-to-end workflows (from scripting to editing, visuals, and virtual/hybrid production). A key milestone is also ahead in Jõhvi: the IDA Hub grand opening in August 2026, giving new momentum to the film campus ambitions. In one sentence, 2025 was a year where both scale and quality increased: more applications, more mature teams, stronger partnerships, and very tangible results – both in funding raised and international breakthroughs. --------- The Estonian startup Thistle, which develops and manufactures mobile counter-drone systems, recently completed its participation in the defence-technology pre-accelerator Defence Business Lab. The programme is designed for startups whose idea has been validated and who have an initial prototype, along with the ambition to further develop and test it in a real environment. Thistle’s CEO, Gerda-Annika Aaslaid, describes the experience as an important milestone for the company: “Defence Business Lab is an excellent introduction for entering the defence sector.” ------- https://www.diana.nato.int/connect/nato-dianas-estonian-accelerator-a-hub-for-defence-innovation-in-tallinn-and-tartu.html NATO DIANA's Estonian Accelerator: a hub for defence innovation in Tallinn and Tartu NATO DIANA "The NATO DIANA Estonian Accelerator is run by Tehnopol Startup Incubator in Tallinn and Sparkup Tartu Science Park in Tartu. Our focus is accelerating technologies in AI, cyber, robotics, energy resilience, healthtech, deep tech, space – work we have led for 20+ years." What is your role within the NATO DIANA programme, and what support do you offer innovators? "2026 will be our third year in NATO DIANA, bringing advanced experience, digital infrastructure, a compact and agile testing environment, allowing startups to showcase their strengths in a geopolitically urgent environment. Our pool of nearly 200 experts in defence, technology, business, legal/IP, and investment are ready to support innovators. Mentors come from organisations such as the Estonian Defence Forces Cyber Command, Estonian Navy, Estonian Defence League, CCDCOE, Milrem, Solita, SensusQ, Combat Ready, Tera VC, and Superangel. Our ecosystem integrates 9 DIANA-affiliated test centres, including TalTech, Foundation CR14, the Estonian National Defence College, the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences - from research to real-life scenarios. As the Estonian ecosystem is small, everyone is one call away, and defence tech companies can find VCs and defence end-users at the same event. The Estonian accelerator and our teams are regularly involved with all major local events like Latitude59, sTARTUp Day, Defence Tech Meetups, CyCon, demo events, Defence Innovation Day, internationally at EBAN congress, and many more." --------- We regularly host high-level guests at innovator events, including the Chief of Staff of the Estonian Defence Forces, Estonia’s Defence Minister, as well as NATO DIANA’s Board of Directors. Our teams boast funding wins: Wayren (€7.9M) and Goldilock (€1.5M). There is real-life defence adoption: Lobster Robotics’ drones are in use by the Dutch Navy. And outside of the scope of DIANA, several innovators have already tested and validated their solutions in Ukraine." Can you share an example of a company that you supported? "Wayren signed a €7.9M strategic agreement during their DIANA journey and were tested during a life-fire HIMARS exercise on Saaremaa by the Estonian Defence Forces." --------- How does your site help connect people to your broader networks? "The Estonian Accelerator bridges the defence and startup ecosystems, connecting innovators to government, industry, academia, and investors: • Government: Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, City of Tallinn • End-users and military: Estonian Defence Forces, Cyber Command, Defence League, CR14, CCDCOE. • Tech & Academia: TalTech, University of Tartu, Milrem Robotics, SensusQ, Skeleton, DefSecIntel. • Investors: Project A, Superangel, Unmanned VC, Defence Angels Network, SmartCap, Tera VC, Plural, and others." -------- https://easychair.org/cfp/CyCon2026 CyCon 2026: 18th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Securing tomorrow Hilton Tallinn Park Tallinn, Estonia, May 26-29, 2026 Throughout the years, the International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon) has established itself as a prominent multidisciplinary conference, with keynotes and panels focusing on the technical, legal, policy, strategy and military perspectives of cyber defence and security. This is undoubtedly thanks to the amount of high-quality original academic research presented at the conference. The theme of Cycon 2026 is "Securing Tomorrow". The pace of technological development shows no sign of slowing. Each breakthrough in connectivity, computing, and automation shapes a world that is more dependent on digital systems and evermore vulnerable to their disruption. As we innovate, we must also anticipate. Securing tomorrow begins now, with the decisions we make and the strategies we set in motion today. How do governments, industry leaders, legal experts, and technologists work together to adapt to new threats and secure tomorrow? Submission Guidelines All papers must be original and not simultaneously submitted to another journal or conference. List of Topics Cyber security and cyber defence strategy and doctrine. Legal and ethical dimensions of cyber operations. Technological advancements (e.g. artificial intelligence, autonomous systems). Military applications of cyber capabilities. Cyber resilience at national and international levels. Cyber operations in hybrid and information/psychological warfare contexts, multi domain operations, and joint operations. Collaboration between private - public sector, civilian and military in the cyber domain. --------- https://www.estmil.tech/ EstMil.tech Military Decision Making in the Era of New Technologies January 14-15, 2026 in Tallinn, Estonia ---- About EstMil.tech 2026 The speed and efficiency of decision-making is the key to success on the battlefield. The rapid integration of technology into human decision-making creates many opportunities for facilitating military operations, while also raises new challenges and risks. For example, artificial intelligence (AI) may give nations advantages by increasing situational awareness and assisting with decision-making at machine speed, yet it could also involve risks, e.g. by recommending targets for lethal force and enabling military systems to take actions without human control. Introducing new technologies into the human-centered command chain also raises the question as to how AI techniques fit in to existing procedures, concepts, and capabilities of military organizations. To address the above issues, a systematic review would be essential. Decision-making systems should be looked at from an integrated perspective of cognitive, organizational, cultural, and ethical aspects of military decision-making and the role of technology in it. 20241223201432-1f0d3c79-me_edited.jpg 20240424160313-6475d6db-me_edited.jpg The main theme of the conference is related to the challenges of technology in military decision-making. Sub-themes include the role of military AI in future conflicts, the impact of cognitive warfare, and the challenges of joint operations. Conference participants include security experts, representatives of armed forces and defence industry, as well as researchers involved in the development of emerging and dual-use technologies. ​ The conference will cover the following topics: • Future of military decision making • Role of AI in future conflicts • Cognitive warfare with superior adversary • Cooperation models with academia and industry ------ https://www.freethink.com/biotech/synchron-bci#:~:text=But%20Synchron%20may%20be%20ahead,Australia%2C%20another%20in%20the%20US. “Hello, world!” read one inconspicuous tweet posted on the Twitter account of Tom Oxley, founder and CEO of Synchron, a startup that develops brain-computer interfaces (BCIs), in December 2021. The tweet wasn’t written by Oxley but one of Synchron’s patients, Philip O’Keefe. O’Keefe suffers from ALS, a neurodegenerative disease that is causing him to gradually lose control of his muscles. His BCI, implanted almost two years prior, allowed him to type out the message with his mind, partially restoring his ability to communicate and interact with the world. When BCIs pop up in the popular media, it’s often in connection to Elon Musk’s Neuralink. But Synchron may be ahead of the game in some respects. The company was founded four years earlier than its chief competitor, in 2012, has received investments from Bill Gates and Jeff Bezos, and has already launched two trials – one in Australia, another in the US. The company’s key advantage over Neuralink, which took on its first human patient earlier this year, is that its BCIs do not require brain surgery. Where Neuralink implants its interfaces directly into the cerebral cortex, Synchron implants its devices through the patient’s bloodstream, circumventing the cost and risks of physically penetrating the human skull. In August 2020, the FDA designated Synchron’s BCI as a Breakthrough Device, acknowledging its potential to improve treatment for debilitating or life-altering conditions, and paving the way for clinical trials. So far, the results are promising. “There are 8 million people in the US living with various forms of paralysis,” Synchron’s CTO, Riki Banerjee, explained in a recent talk at EmTech 2024, a yearly conference on emerging technologies hosted by MIT. “You lose the ability to control not just your interactions with others, but also your environment – whether it’s adjusting the thermostat or ensuring home security. We see BCI as a way to restore this lost connection.” In an interview with Freethink, Banerjee explains how Synchron’s BCI works, the tech that informed its design, and what it has been able to do for those who agreed to let the company put its invention inside their bodies. ------- How Synchron’s BCI works Before joining Synchron, Banerjee spent 15 years in neuromodulation research, which involves stimulating nerve activity through electrical and chemical stimuli. Neuromodulation and – by extension – BCIs evolved from pacemaker technology that dates back to the 1950s, a time when brain implants were still the stuff of science fiction. “The field has seen significant growth over the last 5 to 10 years,” she tells Freethink over Zoom, with initial research focusing on mental disorders like OCD, depression, and insomnia before moving on to other conditions like paralysis. “Neurotech is not just about the brain,” she explains. “It involves the entire nervous system, including peripheral nerves.” “The cranium attenuates brainwaves. This is fortunate insofar as we don’t want others to hear our thoughts, but it also complicates treatment.” Riki Banerjee Synchron’s decision to develop a BCI that could be delivered through a vein started from the complications of brain surgery. “Accessing the brain is a complex and often highly specialized procedure,” Banerjee says. “There are only around 1,000 to 2,000 neurosurgeons who can perform these types of surgeries, which – while they have long been approved for conditions like Parkinson’s or epilepsy – remain a barrier for many.” Still, the company understood that for their BCI’s to work properly, they needed to find a way to get them into the brain: “It’s the skull that gets in the way. From a signal processing perspective, the cranium attenuates brainwaves. This is fortunate insofar as we don’t want others to hear our thoughts, but it also complicates treatment.” Synchron’s BCI is inserted via the jugular vein, which runs up the neck into the brain, using a catheter. Once in the brain, the catheter releases a self-expanding device made from Nitinol, a biocompatible, erosion-resistant nickel-titanium alloy, which is commonly used to widen arteries in surgical procedures. As Banerjee explained in her talk at EmTech, the implanted BCI can detect certain brain waves and send them to a separate receiver, implanted in the chest. In patients suffering from paralysis, the system can transmit their intended but unperformed physical actions to an external device, like a phone, TV remote, or Amazon Alexa, allowing them to use these devices without their voice or hands. “Our devices are designed for chronic implantation,” Banerjee tells Freethink, “meaning they stay in the body for years. In Australia, we have a patient whose implant has been in place for over four years at this point.” Banerjee says that malfunctioning implants can be repaired by updating their software from the outside. While the brain implant cannot be removed, because tissue grows around the device, the chest component can be taken out and replaced. ------- Elad Levy, principal investigator of the study and L. Nelson Hopkins Endowed Chair of Neurosurgery at the Jacobs School of Medicine and Biomedical Sciences at the University at Buffalo, referred to the trial as a “major medical milestone,” adding that “this minimally-invasive approach has the potential to unlock BCI technology at scale for the millions of patients with paralysis and other mobility challenges.” News coverage of the trials has largely focused on how the BCIs have improved the lives of individual patients. An article from Wired followed Mark, a 64-year-old with ALS, who received his BCI in August 2023. As the trials progressed, Synchron worked to make its implant compatible with various popular electronic devices, including Alexa, which Mark can now command without using his voice. According to the article, Synchron was also able to connect Mark’s BCI to the Apple Vision Pro, a mixed reality headset which – after updates – allowed Mark to play video games like Solitaire by moving the cursor with his thoughts. Looking ahead As promising as these trials have been, it’s important to note that the time frame is too short, and the number of participants too few, to draw “firm conclusions,” as Banerjee herself said at EmTech. That said, each new test allows Synchron to better understand the long-term challenges of brain implants and improve their devices accordingly. In 2025, the company plans to launch its third trial – this time with a commercially available system. In addition to increasing the processing speeds of their BCIs, Synchron is hoping to use the implants to treat other conditions related to the brain and nervous system. “The current system requires a device on the chest for power and communication,” Banerjee says of the future, “but our next system will have a rechargeable battery, improving usability. Patients will be able to use it anytime, even if they wake up in the middle of the night.” Along the way, she hopes her work will be able to change the negative, mistrustful attitudes that many people have of brain implants. “The biggest misconception is that we’re directly reading people’s thoughts,” she says. “Actually, we’re looking at small signals – like tapping a finger to click a mouse –simple on/off actions. We’re translating that to activity on a screen or computer. From a privacy standpoint, we’re not extrapolating thoughts. That’s a long way off. In truth, we give away more information using our phones, credit cards, and apps than we do with these implants. The privacy concerns about reading thoughts are far from reality. For now, it’s more like computer code than thought-reading.” We’d love to hear from you! If you have a comment about this article or if you have a tip for a future Freethink story, please email us at tips@freethink.com. ------- https://www.dw.com/en/china-ai-artificial-intelligence-deepseek-us-chatgpt-semiconductors-graphics-technology-v2/a-74361630#:~:text=Beijing%20is%20also%20pushing%20its,history%2C%20culture%20and%20truth%20itself. Can Europe keep up with the US, China in the high-tech race? 02:53 The pressure to innovate under such constraints is driving China to find smarter, more efficient ways to scale AI, potentially accelerating its ambition for long-term independence. This is an outcome far from what Washington intended. "US chip export restrictions to China are counterproductive. They incentivize firms like DeepSeek to optimize older hardware, advancing research," Domingos said, referring to how the Chinese firm built powerful AI models using less advanced chips by finding smarter ways to train them. US pushes AI frontier, China seeks global markets The US still leads the AI race in frontier research, figuring out how to build systems that understand language better, follow instructions more reliably and avoid harmful behavior. US tech firms are also exploring advanced AI for images, video and can even make decisions on its own. China is, however, gaining ground in real-world impact and international reach by exporting AI infrastructure and open-source models to developing countries, eager for digital infrastructure. The likes of Alibaba and Huawei are building data centers and cloud platforms across Asia, Africa and Europe, offering cheaper alternatives to US providers. Beijing is also pushing its own AI governance frameworks internationally, aiming to shape global standards according to its national interests. By promoting models trained on Chinese data and values, the government wants to influence how AI systems interpret history, culture and truth itself. This, of course, comes from an authoritarian system where freedom of expression is tightly controlled. As Domingos put it: "Whoever controls the large language models controls the past and the future … Large language models shape reality and China wants models that reflect their version of it." Robin Feldman, director of the AI Law and Innovation Institute at UC Law in San Francisco, went further, describing the AI race as a "new form of Cold War." "That war will be won by the country that can develop and maintain the greatest lead in artificial intelligence," he told US news site Axios. Edited by: Uwe Hessler Correction, October 21, 2025: An earlier version of this article misspelled the name of NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang. DW apologizes for the error. ---------- https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/bitstreams/fa253285-7555-41e0-9e2c-631e508553cd/download -------- https://www.ituc-csi.org/corporate-underminers-of-democracy-2025#:~:text=Palantir%20Technologies:%20Owned%20by%20far%2Dright%20billionaire%20Peter,warfare%2C%20policing%2C%20immigration%20enforcement%20and%20intelligence%20analysis. 2025 CORPORATE UNDERMINERS OF DEMOCRACY The 2024 edition of Corporate Underminers of Democracy demonstrated the pervasiveness of anti-democratic behaviour across the corporate world, implicating institutional investors (Vanguard), private equity (Blackstone), big tech (Meta, Amazon), automotive firms (Tesla), and heavy industry giants (Exxon, Glencore). This year’s list focuses on the rising threat to democracy posed by major and emerging players in the rapid militarisation of the global economy. In 2025, these companies are enabling growing militarism, demanding egregious deregulation, overseeing declines in – or leading outright opposition to workplace democracy, and aligning with far-right forces that seek to roll back the modest progress made over the past 80 years towards pluralist democracy and peace. In our 2025 analysis, seven companies in particular stand out: Amazon.com (returning): Billionaire Jeff Bezos’s Amazon returns to our list after being named a Corporate Underminer of Democracy in 2024. Regularly hosting defence industry events and marketing itself as “Amazon for Warfighters,” the company joins other tech industry players in seeking to grow its taxpayer-funded revenue streams through the arms industry while platforming and associating with far-right figures. Anduril Industries: Anduril is perhaps the least-known entry into this year’s list. Described as “straddling the line between hacker culture and hawkish ideology,” its niche lies in building dystopian autonomous killing machines. Meta Platforms Inc. (returning): Meta, named a Corporate Underminer in 2024, returns to our list as billionaire CEO Mark Zuckerberg accelerates its pivot towards far-right ideology and military contracting. Northrop Grumman: Northrop Grumman “is the single largest nuclear weapons profiteer.” While more sophisticated in disguising its politics than its younger peer companies, Northrop nonetheless finances far-right figures who oppose multilateralism, arms control, and trade unions. Palantir Technologies: Owned by far-right billionaire Peter Thiel, Palantir has, over two decades, become the de facto data operating system for warfare, policing, immigration enforcement and intelligence analysis. Space Exploration Technologies: Far-right billionaire Elon Musk’s SpaceX is now deeply embedded in military planning and deployments, while the profits Musk reaps are channelled into far-right political projects on multiple continents. Vanguard (returning): The largest investor in nuclear weapons production in the world, Vanguard returns to our list after being named a Corporate Underminer of Democracy in 2024. While notorious rival BlackRock scrambles to navigate right-wing attacks on its alleged “wokeism,” Vanguard quickly abandoned its environmental and social governance pledges to curry favour with the American far right. ---------- https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/aerospace-and-defense/our-insights/a-rising-wave-of-tech-disruptors-the-future-of-defense-innovation A rising wave of tech disruptors: The future of defense innovation? February 22, 2024 | Article For several decades, national security agendas focused primarily on asymmetric and transnational threats such as terrorism and cybercrime. However, sometimes the uncertain global geopolitical environment can cause peer and near-peer competition, as evidenced in the national security strategies published since 2022 in Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.4 These strategies can lead to demand for new technologies to increase resilience and efficacy—in particular, technologies that will support new disaggregated and “joint all-domain” concepts. We have noticed that there is a call for three overlapping sets of capabilities: Disaggregating capabilities: By disaggregating capabilities into networks of smaller nodes, force planners can reduce points of failure and increase the likelihood of successful missions connecting air, land, sea, and space assets. This could improve operational coverage while boosting resilience. Instead of one high-value satellite, for example, the preference might be for an array of smaller, linked satellites; instead of one manned submarine, a coordinated fleet of unmanned underwater vehicles. Effective communication networks: For such disaggregated assets to function collectively, real-time intelligence sharing—enabled by resilient and effective communication networks—is important. Resilient networks can ensure instant communication between assets (meshing sensors to effectors) and allow for smooth, responsive operations. Resilient network-enabling technologies such as 5G, phased-array antennas, artificial intelligence (AI), and high-density computing can enable the movement of responsive decision making to the tactical edge where they can have the greatest mission impact. New technologies: Engineering high bandwidth, resilient networks would likely involve retrofitting existing platforms—or developing entirely new architectures (such as AI-powered command-and-control systems that connect users across services and collation partners in air, land, sea, and space). The density of technology-enabled mission systems is likely to continue to increase for the foreseeable future. Either way, new technologies—including decentralized cloud computing, data management, edge analytics, autonomy-enabling systems, and a plethora of hardware solutions and novel materials—are frequently cited capability needs. Start-ups (along with their commercial hyperscaler counterparts) are well positioned to fulfill critical national security needs, complementing the traditional industrial base. ------- These capabilities alone, however, may no longer be enough. In response to evolving needs, a new generation of security tech companies has materialized. This new cohort features both start-ups and commercial technology hyperscalers and can offer different but complementary benefits: greater spend on high-risk R&D, relative to size, than the average defense contractor top-tier software and a new generation of STEM talent with fluency in digital technologies such as AI, quantum computing, and advanced microelectronics product-oriented business models that tend to be faster, cheaper, and more innovative a focus on commercially priced, scalable products and services The European Union and the United States have signaled interest in these novel capabilities. The US Department of Defense has taken steps to access commercial technology through new acquisition and budgeting authorities—for example, increasing the prominence of the Defense Innovation Unit and establishing the Replicator initiative in 2023 to rapidly field autonomous, attritable systems.6 NATO has formed an innovation accelerator (DIANA) to foster collaboration with start-ups and other tech companies, and has announced the €1 billion NATO Innovation Fund focused on dual-use technologies.7 Private capital has also indicated an intent to pursue defense tech opportunities, and we have observed that VC investment in such technologies outpaced the overall growth in venture spending between 2019 and 2023. Meanwhile, traditional defense firms have increased their corporate venture funds to be able to access the emerging tech. New defense tech companies face obstacles Despite this momentum, many next-generation defense tech firms have struggled to do business at scale with national security organizations.8 This is likely due to three main challenges: Reconciling program-centric versus product-centric operating models. National security customers often seek bespoke solutions to very specific problems versus an “out of the box” commercial offering. With limited access to classified information and other sources of insight, tech firms can struggle to understand the precise nature of these problems. The effort to tailor an existing solution to the “last mile” in defense may also not be compatible with the commercial scale business models favored by tech companies. Building a go-to-market muscle for defense markets. New defense tech companies can be constrained by unfamiliarity with the government sales and contracting landscape. Scaling a solution in defense markets requires a robust government affairs operation and an understanding of unique government procurement processes. Start-ups, in particular, often lack a track record of performing on programs of record at defense agencies, which can be an important requirement for winning new contracts. Aligning revenue timelines with investor expectations. Government contracting often offers an atypical return profile to private capital (such as VCs and growth equity) that has become the primary backer of defense tech start-ups. Private investors tend to look at three- to five-year horizons for returns—which can be out of sync with the slower (traditionally seven- to ten-year) pace of defense programs of record. A start-up may run short on funding before consistent revenue from government contracts begins to materialize. This mismatch is likely to deter private investment. Public markets are unlikely to fill this gap entirely, given their emphasis on short-term results and an aerospace and defense investor base that often emphasizes stable cash flows versus at-risk investments in novel technologies. Meanwhile, governmental entities in Europe and the United States generally invest less in innovation than their private sector counterparts: for example, the US national security community has recently been spending less than 5 percent of its total budget on developing innovative technologies, whereas a typical commercial technology firm spends three to four times that share of revenue annually.9 -------- from prototyping resources onwards, can make the difference on time to market. Lower barriers by leveraging more established partners. Once a product’s validity has been demonstrated, partnership with an established industrial defense company could facilitate its entry to market. Established suppliers can bring installed bases, mission expertise, and customer familiarity that complements tech companies’ capabilities. Established suppliers often shape access to the aircraft, land systems, and ships that new mission systems will be integrated into by providing the “socket” into which a disruptor’s “lightbulbs” can plug. The list of recent partnership announcements between defense tech disruptors and traditional defense organizations span hardware and software across a range of technology focus areas, including 5G, hypersonic aircraft, autonomy for next-generation tactical aircraft, AI, and edge networks.10 Take, for example, defense disruptor, Helsing, which was able to get to a program of record in fewer than three years by partnering with an existing defense prime (Saab). Helsing’s AI and signal processing expertise complemented Saab’s hardware-based sensors and self-protection systems. As a result of the two companies growing closer, Saab in September 2023 made a sizeable investment of €75 million in Helsing’s most recent venture round, at an overall valuation of €1.5 billion.11 Go dual use. Purely can struggle to achieve scale defense-focused start-ups before investors become frustrated with delays. But, companies that find nonmilitary applications for their technologies can build scale in commercial markets, while buying the time needed to secure a long-term defense contract. However, pursuing dual-use innovations may also mean designing a two-speed business model to accommodate disparate timelines and unique international security requirements. Strong demand and healthy capital inflows have allowed certain dual-use tech organizations to thrive. Private investors, who have a higher tolerance for risk than public markets or government R&D appropriators, in many cases are looking to back dual-use technology, given its large potential returns and broad applicability.12 Vertically integrate to provide software and hardware in one solution. Defense customers generally are comfortable with purchasing integrated hardware and software products, rather than stand-alone software capabilities that can be applied to a range of hardware. For tech disruptors, opting to sell a piece of differentiated software packaged within hardware can be beneficial (for example, a fleet of ready-to-deploy drones rather than a drone operating system). Tailor sales capabilities to the customer. Selling to defense customers can be a challenge if a company hasn’t set up a government affairs unit with proper clearances and extensive experience. Tech companies can look beyond a defense organization’s broad requests for proposals and focus on communicating with potential customers about granular needs. Defense oriented technology is a vital and enduring component of national security. Start-ups, scaled commercial organizations, traditional defense contractors, and investors all have roles to play in integrating innovative new technologies into the defense ecosystem. How relevant and useful is this article for you? About the author(s) Jesse Klempner is a partner in McKinsey’s Washington, DC, office and a leader in McKinsey’s Aerospace & Defense Practice; Christian Rodriguez is an associate partner in the Washington, DC, office; Dale Swartz is a partner in the Bay Area–Silicon Valley office and a leader in the Aerospace & Defense and Tech Practices. The authors wish to thank Bo Julie Crowley, Alyssa Goessler, Karl Hujsak, and Chester Pennock for their contributions to this article. ------- https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/63e9e8f88fa8f5050ee37d10/rhc-neurotechnology-regulation.pdf Neurotechnology Regulation The Regulatory Horizons Council November 2022 he UK is very well placed to deliver on the potential of neurotechnology. Its thriving research ecosystem, recognised ethical research frameworks and centralised health service provide a valuable platform to develop, launch and assess new neurotechnologies. Nonetheless, almost 60% of respondents of a survey conducted by the Knowledge Transfer Network (KTN) rated ‘difficulty navigating the regulatory pathway’ as a moderate or major barrier to commercialisation. We therefore very much welcome this report by the Regulatory Horizons Council (RHC) on neurotechnology regulation. Regulation does not necessarily have to be a barrier to innovation. It can also be a key enabler. By addressing early on the challenges neurotechnology could pose in the future, the UK government has an opportunity to guide the development of the sector and unlock the potential of neurotechnology, on an equitable basis, so that it can benefit society as a whole. With its report, the RHC builds upon the vision outlined by KTN in its ‘Transformative Roadmap for Neurotechnology in the UK.’ We think the RHC’s recommendations will help establish a proportionate regulatory framework across medical and non- medical neurotechnologies that will encourage their rapid and safe development and commercialisation in the UK. We also welcome the RHC’s proposals for -------- RHC Report on Neurotechnology Regulation 35 Recommendation 6: The MHRA, Approved Bodies and the NHS should work together to establish a sandbox programme for neurotechnology devices in the UK. Drawing on experiences from the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) Sandbox Programme92, the NHS Testbeds Programme93, and the DiGA94 (Digitale Gesundheitsanwendungen, ‘Digital Health Applications’) fast-track scheme in Germany, the suggested sandbox programme would provide an environment in which regulators and manufacturers can collaborate in a pre-competitive space to facilitate safe harbour discussions concerning neurotechnologies that do not have a well- trodden regulatory pathway and where the ability of MHRA to directly provide advice may be more limited. Promising innovative devices that meet the essential safety requirements could be made available to patients on a small scale and during a one-to-two-year period, whilst data are generated to determine medical benefit. During this period, manufacturers could be reimbursed for the use of their devices and be issued a ‘comfort from enforcement’ notice, indicating that there will not be immediate regulatory action over any breaches of the existing medical devices regulations, as long as there is continuous engagement and communication between the manufacturer and the regulators, and any breaches are notified immediately. Similar to the FDA Breakthrough Device Designation,95 eligible manufacturers would also benefit from 92 In 2019, ICO launched its sandbox programme. Participants of the sandbox programme can expect not to be immediately prosecuted for any breaches in the data protection framework as long as a collaborative and cooperative dialogue is maintained with the ICO Sandbox Team. Participants also benefit from receiving tailored support and advice from ICO experts to embed ‘data protection by design.’ The programme is open to all organisations that intend to develop innovative services that use personal data, but ICO publishes the areas of focus they would be interested in working on to guide applications. For more information see https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/regulatory-sandbox/the-guide-to-the-sandbox/ 93 NHS Test Beds are partnerships between businesses and NHS organisations (which can also include academia, local government and the third sector) that are established to test combinations of innovations (digital products and services) in a real clinical setting, improving patient care at the same or less cost. For further information see https://www.england.nhs.uk/aac/what-we-do/how-can-the-aac-help-me/test- beds/nhs-test-beds-programme/ 94 In Germany, patients are reimbursed when they purchase a Digital Health Application listed on the DiGA directorate. To be in the directorate, candidate applications need to prove they meet the necessary security, functionality, quality, data protection, data security and interoperability requirements as well as having a CE mark. They also need to prove they have a medical benefit but, even if they cannot, they can still enter the directorate for a period of 1 year (max 2) until the benefit is established through a comparative study. For further information see: DiGA and The Fast-Track Process for Digital Health Applications (DiGA) according to Section 139e SGB V (German FIDMD Guidance) 95 In the US, some medical devices are eligible for the FDA’s BDD, i.e. when a device provides more effective treatment or diagnosis of life-threatening or irreversibly debilitating human disease or conditions and meets one of the following criteria: 1) it represents breakthrough technology; 2) no approved or cleared alternatives exist; 3) it offers significant advantages over existing approved or cleared alternatives; or 4) its availability is in the best interest of the patient. Beneficiaries of this exemption can enjoy expedited engagement with the FDA (including sprint discussions and engagement with senior management), receive help drafting a data development plan that may allow for more post-market over pre-market data collection, guidance on more efficient and flexible design of clinical studies, and priority review of submissions. For further information see: Breakthrough Devices Program and Breakthrough Devices Program FDA Guidance 2018